Tag Archive | administrator privileges

Surge in Grabbing Unauthorized Access

Authorization, an access control system, is all about administering and providing sensitive system access to a process or an application or a class of users based on their privilege level. Privacy and security concerns arise when system resources are accessed by an unauthorized process, application, or user.

Application and system developers always strive to incorporate secure authorization systems in their software. On the other hand, hackers come forth with new exploit techniques to elevate the access privilege associated with a specific process, system, or user. Many of the attacks start with an entry into the targeted systems with limited privileges and then an attempt to elevate privileges by exploiting a vulnerability in the OS itself or in third-party installations.

We conducted a short piece of research work on Elevation of Privilege (EoP) vulnerabilities using publicly available information on vulnerabilities discovered in operating systems, desktop applications and browsers. Interestingly the data indicates a significant rise in EoP vulnerabilities over the past two–and-half years.

From our research set on Microsoft Windows operating system vulnerabilities found over the time period mentioned earlier, we found that out of 700 vulnerabilities, 115 vulnerabilities were Privilege Escalation vulnerabilities, i.e. approximately 16%. It is clear from the research data set that attackers or malware writers are focusing more on EoP vulnerabilities to carry out their malicious attack as silently as possible.

Standalone exploitation of EoP vulnerability might not be sufficient for the attacker to achieve the required destructive behavior thus forcing the attacker to look for yet more vulnerability in the system to exploit.

The following is a list of commonly exploited Windows components:

The Group Policy Service
Windows kernel-mode driver (Win32k.sys)
Cryptography Next Generation kernel-mode driver (cng.sys)
WebDAV kernel-mode driver (mrxdav.sys)
TS WebProxy Windows component
Windows User Profile Service (ProfSvc)
Microsoft IME
TypeFilterLevel Checks
Windows audio service component
Windows TCP/IP stack (tcpip.sys, tcpip6.sys)
Kerberos KDC
FASTFAT system driver, FAT32 disk partitions
Message Queuing service
.NET Framework
Windows Task Scheduler
Windows Installer service
DirectShow
Ancillary Function Driver
On-Screen Keyboard
ShellExecute API
TypeFilterLevel checks
Group Policy preferences
NDProxy component
Local Remote Procedure Call
Windows audio port-class driver (portcls.sys)
Hyper-V
USB drivers
Windows App Container
DirectX graphics kernel subsystem (dxgkrnl.sys)
Service Control Manager (SCM)
NT Virtual DOS Machine (Ntvdm.exe)
asynchronous RPC requests handling (Rpcss.dll)
TrueType font files handling
Windows Print Spooler (Win32spl.dl)
NTFS kernel-mode driver (ntfs.sys)
Windows CSRSS (cmd.exe)
Remote Desktop ActiveX control (mstscax.dll)
Windows USB drivers

We see that the attackers often aim at a relatively highly destructive attack by exploiting privilege escalation and code execution vulnerabilities together.

Techniques employed by malware writer constantly evolve to achieve the desired privilege escalation undetected. There are many privilege elevation techniques publicly available online, such as:

  1. METHOD OF PROVIDING A COMPUTER USER WITH HIGH LEVEL PRIVILEGES, PATENT 7,945,947
  2. Exploiting The Known Failure Mechanism in DDR3 Memory referred to as Row Hammer to gain kernel privilege with the only “patch” being a replacement of the DRAM!

Sometimes it is simply not possible to patch a vulnerability.

Elevation of Privilege is not limited only to operating systems but is also witnessed in desktop applications, browsers, web applications and even in hardware. With the increasing popularity of Internet of Things across devices everywhere, the effect of exploiting an  Elevation of Privilege vulnerability in just one of the links in Internet of Things could give the attacker complete control of the whole system.

Image courtesy of: tompattersontalks.blogspot.in

Priyal Viroja, Vulnerability Researcher, K7TCL
Re-published by K7 Computing Ireland

K7 Computing webistes:

K7 Computing Ireland: www.k7computing.ie, K7 Computing UK: www.k7computing.co.uk

Drop By @ AppData’s – Open Round the Clock

Malware authors work round the clock to serve up mouth-watering malware to an unsuspecting victim.

What we have on today’s menu is a small but effective tweak that malware authors incorporated into their “software” that makes %AppData% the prime real estate on your system’s hard drive for malware and their families.

The Application Data area of the current user, to be more specific. This is one location on your hard drive that stands exposed to multiple hits of various malware families.Hard drive

For starters let’s look at where this folder is found on your machine. In WinXP it’s at <root>\Documents and settings\%Current_User%\Application Data and<root>\Documents and settings\%Current_User%\Local Settings\Application Data. For Vista and Windows 7 it’s at<root>\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming and <root>\Users\<username>\AppData\Local. (Please feel free to do a quick check in these areas on your computer to find out if you have something suspicious lurking…)

It wasn’t always this way. It was only recently that most of the file-copy actions moved from the Windows, System32, and Program Files directories to the %AppData% directory.

So, “Why move away from the system areas?”, you might ask. Well, that’s the main course. The basic answer could well be that relatively recent flavours of Windows, i.e. Vista and Windows 7, with their more strengthen security measures, have succeeded to a certain level, in forcing malware authors out of the system areas to the %AppData% areas.

System areas are now protected and require Administrator privileges to effect a modification.  So why worry about putting in extra code when it’s not needed, the malware authors might have thought. Malware families with a legacy, like ZBot, have moved out of the system directories. Yes, gone are the days of %System%\SDRA64.EXE%System%\NTOS.EXE etc. It’s now just random folders and random filenames in the AppData path. Rogue AVs that ‘Installed’ under proper program directories, viz. %Program Files%\Antivirus 2008\Antvrs.exe, have now become ‘xyz123.exe’s in %AppData%.

And, finally, for dessert. We would only say that the system directories haven’t been deserted entirely but have just been relegated to second choice. AppData is the new “system area” for malware authors. Note, under Windows XP you don’t require administrator privileges to copy any file into a system area and masquerade as a system file.

Kaarthik
K7TCL

K7 Computing UK | K7 Computing IRL